The workshop Consequence and Paradox: Between Truth and Proof is organized by Luca Tranchini as part of the DFG-funded project Logical consequence and paradoxical reasoning. The workshop is funded by the DFG and by the Division for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.
The notion of logical consequence has been traditionally analysed as necessary truth-preservation, and such an analysis is at the core of contemporary model-theoretic approaches to semantics. An alternative approach to semantics is inferentialism, according to which the notions of inference and proof should play a more fundamental role than those of reference, truth and satisfaction in the construction of a semantic theory.
Inferentialism has mostly been developed in opposition to the more traditional semantic approach. However, the tight relationships between the basic concepts involved in the two approaches suggest a more complex interplay than mere opposition. Examples of this interplay are the investigations using proof-theoretic techniques of the notion of truth, or current research in the proof-theory of non-classical logic based on uniform methods of recasting model-theoretic techniques (e.g. Kripke-style semantics) in a purely syntactic fashion. More generally, many of the central notions (e.g. admissibility) and results (e.g. interpolation) in logic usually have both a model-theoretic and a proof-theoretic dimension. Moreover, the notions of truth and proof, when conceived as the central notions of a theory of meaning, share many of their core features (for instance for sufficiently strong theories, neither truth nor informal provability can be exhaustively characterized in terms of derivability in any formal system).
This complex interplay between truth and proof can be found in current debates on paradoxes as well. Solutions to paradoxes are motivated sometimes by traditional semantic considerations, sometimes by considerations about the structural features of our inferential practices. Plausibly, a thorough understanding of paradoxes requires resources coming from both model-theoretic and inferential conceptions of language and meaning.
The aim of the workshop is to bring together researchers working on different aspects of logical consequence and paradoxes to exchange ideas and methods and discuss recent results.
- Pablo Cobreros (University of Navarra)
- Volker Halbach (Oxford University)
- Marianna Antonutti Marfori (LMU Munich)
- Sara Negri (Helsinki University)
- Paolo Pistone (University of Roma 3)
- Jean-Yves Béziau (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
- Marcos Cramer (University of Luxembourg)
- Jérémie Dauphin (University of Luxembourg)
- Bogdan Dicher (University of Cagliari)
- Jonathan Dittrich (LMU Munich)
- Giulia Felappi (University of Southampton)
- João Marcos (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte)
- Eugenio Orlandelli (University of Bologna)
- Mattia Petrolo (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
- Lucas Rosenblatt (University of Buenos Aires)
- Chris Scambler (New York University)
- Kordula Świętorzecka (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw)
Participants who do not want to give a contributed talk are also welcome.
Please send an email to Marine Gaudefroy-Bergmann at email@example.com
by 15 January.